Speech signals are a rich source of speaker-related information including sensitive attributes like identity or accent. With a small amount of found speech data, such attributes can be extracted and modeled for malicious purposes like voice cloning, spoofing, etc. In this paper, we investigate speaker anonymization strategies based on voice conversion. In contrast to prior evaluations, we argue that different types of attackers can be defined depending on the extent of their knowledge about the conversion scheme. We compare two frequency warping-based conversion methods and a deep learning based method in three attack scenarios. The utility of the converted speech is measured through the word error rate achieved by automatic speech recognition, while privacy protection is assessed by state-of-the-art speaker verification techniques (i-vectors and xvectors). Our results show that voice conversion schemes are unable to effectively protect against an attacker that has extensive knowledge of the type of conversion and how it has been applied, but may provide some protection against less knowledgeable attackers.
INTRODUCTION
Dramatic improvements in speech synthesis [1] , voice cloning [2, 3] and speaker recognition [4] that leverage "found data" pose a severe privacy threat to the users of pervasive speech interfaces [5] . Speaker anonymization or de-identification [6] [7] [8] refers to the task of concealing the speaker's identity from an attacker while retaining the linguistic content. The anonymized data should prevent an attacker from recognizing the speaker while preserving the perceived speech naturalness and intelligibility and/or the performance of downstream tasks such as automatic speech recognition (ASR).
Fang et al. [9] classify speaker anonymization methods into two categories: physical vs. logical. Physical methods perturb speech in the physical space by adding acoustic noise, while logical methods apply a transformation to the recorded signal. Among the latter, voice conversion (VC) methods have been traditionally exploited as a way to map the input voice (source) into that of another speaker (target) [10] [11] [12] . In contrast to feature-domain approaches [8] , the This work was supported in part by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program under Grant Agreement No. 825081 COMPRISE (https://www.compriseh2020.eu/) and by the French National Research Agency under project DEEP-PRIVACY (ANR-18-CE23-0018). Experiments presented in this paper were carried out using the Grid'5000 testbed, supported by a scientific interest group hosted by Inria and including CNRS, RENATER and several Universities as well as other organizations (see https://www.grid5000.fr).
output of VC remains a speech waveform and it may be used for listening or transcription purposes. The anonymized speech should thus sound as natural and intelligible as possible [13] .
Crucially, all previous anonymization studies were conducted in a weak attack scenario where the attacker is unaware that an anonymization method has been applied to the found data [9] . This raises the concern that the privacy protection may entirely rely on the secrecy of the design and implementation details of the voice transformation scheme, a principle known as "security by obscurity" [14] that has long been rejected by the security community. There is therefore a strong need to evaluate the robustness of the anonymization to the knowledge that the adversary may have about the transformation scheme. In practice, such knowledge may for instance be acquired by inspecting the code embedded in the user's device or in an open-source implementation.
As opposed to previous studies, we hypothesize several types of attackers based on their knowledge of the anonymization method that has been applied to the speech data, and place them on a continuum. At one end, an Ignorant attacker is unaware of the speech transformation being applied to the incoming data, while at the other end an Informed attacker can leverage the complete knowledge of the transformation algorithm while training and testing. In the middle, a Semi-Informed attacker may know the voice transformation algorithm but not its exact parameter values. In our experimental study, we evaluate three VC methods with different target speaker selection strategies in various attack scenarios. In each scenario, we assess how well each method is capable of protecting the speaker's identity against attackers that leverage state-of-the-art speaker verification techniques based on i-vectors or x-vectors [4] . We also report the word error rate (WER) achieved by a state-of-the-art end-to-end automatic speech recognizer [15] . While a formal listening test is beyond the scope of this paper, we do make a few samples of converted speech available for informal comparison. 1 In Section 2, we describe the three VC methods we evaluate in the context of anonymization. Section 3 introduces possible target speaker selection strategies and the hypothesized attack scenarios. Section 4 presents the experimental setting and the results. We conclude in Section 5.
VOICE CONVERSION METHODS
The criteria for selecting the VC methods in our study are that they must be 1) non-parallel, i.e., do not require a parallel corpus of sentences uttered by both the source and target speakers for training -this is important from a privacy perspective since there exist few parallel corpora and selecting openly available targets would increase the risk of an inversion attack; 2) many-to-many, i.e., allow conversion between arbitrary sources and targets so that any speaker in a large corpus can be selected as the target ; 3) source-and languageindependent, i.e., do not require enrollment sentences for the source speaker and do not rely on language-specific ASR or phoneme classification -this is important from a usability perspective as it frees the user from the burden of enrolling and it is applicable to any language (including under-resourced ones), and from a privacy perspective since enrollment translates into the storage of a voiceprint which poses even greater privacy threats.
The third criterion is quite strict: many VC methods, such as StarGAN-VC [16] or the ASR-based method in [9] , do not satisfy it. We found that the vocal tract length normalization (VTLN) based methods in [12, 17] and the one-shot method in [18] satisfy all criteria. In this paper, we use models trained over English speech [19] but do not use any other linguistic resources such as transcriptions.
VoiceMask
VoiceMask is described in [12] as the frequency warping method based on the composition of a log-bilinear function, expressed as f (ω, α) = | − i ln z−α 1−αz |, and a quadratic function, given by
Here ω ∈ [0, π] is the normalized frequency, α ∈ [−1, 1] is the warping factor for the bilinear function, z = e iω , and β > 0 is the warping factor for the quadratic function. Therefore, the warping function is of the form g(f (ω, α), β). The two parameters, α and β, are chosen uniformly at random from a predefined range which is found to produce intelligible speech while perceptually concealing the speaker identity. In the following, we apply this transform to the spectral envelope rather than the pitchsynchronous spectrum as in the original paper. In addition, we apply logarithm Gaussian normalized pitch transformation (see [20] ) so as to match the pitch statistics of a target speaker 2 .
The authors claim that this transformation is difficult to inverse when the parameter values are unknown because they are randomly selected from a large interval. However, VoiceMask uses the same parameter values to warp the spectra at each time step of the utterance. This approach is quite limited to conceal the identity of the source speaker and to mimic the target speaker because it warps the entire frequency axis in a single direction.
VTLN-based voice conversion
VTLN-based VC [17] represents each speaker by a set of centroid spectra extracted using the CheapTrick [21] algorithm for k pseudophonetic classes. These classes are learned in an unsupervised fashion by clustering all speech frames of all utterances from this speaker. For each class of the source speaker, the procedure finds the class of the target speaker and the warping parameters that minimize the distance between the transformed source centroid spectrum and the target centroid spectrum. All speech frames in that class are then warped using a power function. Similarly to above, we apply this warping to the spectral envelope and also perform Gaussian normalized pitch transformation so as to match the pitch statistics of the target. Compared to VoiceMask, this approach warps the frequency axis in different directions over time. The parameters of this method include the number of classes k and the chosen target speaker.
Disentangled representation based voice conversion
The third approach is based on disentangled representation of speech as proposed in [18, 22] . The central idea of this work is that speaker information is statically present throughout the utterance but content information is dynamic. This approach is based on a neural network transformation and uses a speaker encoder and a content encoder to separate the factors of variation corresponding to speaker and content information. The content encoder uses instance normalization to cancel out the speaker effect and the speaker encoder uses average pooling to learn global information. During training, an utterance X is fed to the two encoders in parallel and the output embeddings are passed through a decoder to reconstruct X. Then, to map a source utterance to a target speaker, the source utterance is fed to the content encoder and a target utterance to the speaker encoder. The resulting embeddings are passed through the decoder which generates converted speech whose linguistic content corresponds to the source and speaker identity to the target. The only parameter of this method is the chosen target speaker.
TARGET SELECTION STRATEGIES AND ATTACKERS
In the context of this study, we consider that the VC function and the sets of possible parameter values are known to all users. Each user records his/her voice on his/her device and performs a VC step before sending it to a public database. An attacker tries to identify which converted utterances in this public database are spoken by a particular user. To this end, he/she has access to a small amount of found speech from this user (and potentially some additional public resources, such as benchmark speech processing datasets to train generic speaker models).
In the following, we define three parameter selection (a.k.a. target selection) strategies for the three VC methods above, which can be seen as key ingredients of a "private-by-design" speech processing system. We then describe the knowledge that an attacker trying to compromise the system could have about the VC function and the target selection strategy.
Target selection strategies
We consider three possible target selection strategies. In strategy const, the VC function is constant across all users and all utterances. This means choosing a unique target speaker and, in the case of VoiceMask, fixed values for α and β. In strategy perm, the conversion parameters are chosen at random once by each user. In other words, when a user downloads the VC module on his/her device, he/she selects a personal target speaker and, in the case of Voice-Mask, personal random values for α and β. Finally, in the random strategy, each time a user applies VC to an utterance, a random set of parameters is drawn, i.e., a random target speaker is selected and, in the case of VoiceMask, random values are drawn for α and β.
Attacker knowledge
We define the types of attackers based on the extent of their knowledge about the VC function and its parameters. An Ignorant attacker is not aware that VC has been applied at all. In contrast, an Informed attacker knows the VC method and its exact parameter values (i.e., the chosen target speaker and the values of α and β). One may argue that an Informed attacker is not very realistic (except for the const strategy), while an Ignorant attacker is very weak. Between these two extreme cases, various types of attackers can be defined. For instance, we consider a Semi-Informed attacker who knows the chosen VC method (VoiceMask, VTLN, or disentangled representation) and the target selection strategy (const, perm, or random), but not the actual target (i.e., the actual target speaker or the value of α and β). This is arguably more realistic since the VC algorithm and the target selection strategy may be open-source, while (except for the const strategy) the target chosen by the user is much less easily accessible.
It is important to note that many concrete instances of attackers of the above types can be designed, and finding out the "best" attacker of a particular type is a hard problem. In the experiments section, we propose attackers exploiting these different levels of knowledge based on the assumptions defined above. A more exhaustive investigation of the design of attackers is left for future work.
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

Data and evaluation setup
All experiments are performed on the LibriSpeech corpus [19] . We use the 460 h clean training set (train-clean-100 + train-clean-360), which contains 1,172 speakers, to train the disentanglement transform. Out of the test-clean set, we create an enrollment set (438 utterances) and a trial set (1,496 utterances) with different utterances from the same 29 speakers (13 male and 16 female, not in the training set) considered as source speakers. The target speakers for all three VC methods are randomly picked from the training and testclean sets. See [8] for more details.
For each VC method and target selection strategy, all utterances in the trial set are mapped to possibly different target speakers in the training or trial set. The converted trial set serves as the public database that attackers want to de-anonymize. To this end, attackers have access to the enrollment set which serves as the found data used to model the speakers in the trial set.
The attackers also have access to the 460 h training set to train state-of-the-art speaker verification methods based on x-vectors [4] and i-vectors, which are stronger than the Gaussian mixture modeluniversal background model (GMM-UBM) based method used in the seminal work of [13] . We adapt the sre16 Kaldi recipe for training x-vectors and i-vectors to LibriSpeech. 3 We use a smaller network architecture for x-vector computation than the original recipe. Specifically, compared to the architecture in [4, Table 1 ], we remove the frame4, frame5 and segment7 layers, thereby also reducing the stats pooling layer to 512T ×1024 and the segment6 layer to 1024×512. Here T refers to the utterance-level context. This reduced architecture performs slightly better on LibriSpeech than the architecture in the original recipe. We give more details on the different attackers in Section 4.3.
Finally, we evaluate the utility of each VC method in terms of the resulting ASR performance on the converted data. We use a hybrid connectionist temporal classification (CTC) and attention based encoder-decoder [15] trained on the converted 460 h training set using the standard recipe for LibriSpeech provided in ESPnet 4 .
Voice conversion settings
VoiceMask. Pitch, aperiodicity and spectral envelope are extracted using the pyworld vocoder. 5 We follow strategy random only. We sample α uniformly such that |α| ∈ [0.08, 0.10] then β in [−2, 2] such that 0.32 ≤ dist f α,β ≤ 0.40 where dist f α,β = π 0 |f α,β (ω)− ω| is the distortion strength of the warping function. These ranges are provided by VoiceMask's authors in [12] since they produce most intelligible output. A subset of 100 target speakers is randomly selected and, for every utterance, pitch is transformed so as to match a random speaker within that subset. Other target selections strategies have not been applied because fixed values for α and β (whether speaker-dependent or not) are prone to inversion attacks.
VTLN-based VC. Pitch, aperiodicity and spectral envelope are extracted using the pyworld vocoder. For each speaker, we collect speech frames using energy-based voice activity detection (VAD) with a threshold of 0.06. We cluster the corresponding spectral envelopes via k-means with k = 8. In strategy const, only one target speaker is selected. In perm, we draw a random subset of 100 target speakers and, for each source speaker, we select a random target within it. In random, we draw a random subset of 100 target speakers and, for each source utterance, we select a random target within it.
Disentangled representation based VC. We use a publicly available implementation of this method 6 . As per the authors' suggestion in the preprocessing script, we train the disentanglement models (speaker encoder, content encoder, decoder) over the trainclean-100 subset of the LibriTTS corpus (itself a subset of the 460 h training set of LibriSpeech), with a batch size of 128 and learning rate of 0.0005 for 500,000 iterations. All three target selection strategies are applied similarly to VTLN-based VC except that only the source utterance and one random utterance from the target speaker are used as inputs to the content and speaker encoders, respectively. Other utterances from the source and targets speakers are unused.
Attackers
We have implemented several attackers depending on the choice of the VC algorithm and the target selection strategy as well as the extent of the attacker's knowledge (Informed, Semi-Informed or Ignorant). Our Ignorant attacker is unaware of the VC step: he/she simply trains x-vector/i-vector models on the untransformed training set, and applies them to the untransformed enrollment set. Our Semi-Informed attacker knows the VC algorithm and the target selection strategy (const, random or perm) but not the particular choices of targets. He/she applies this strategy to the training and enrollment sets by drawing random target speakers from the subset of 100 target speakers used by the VC method (we assume that the value of k in VTLN is known to the attacker). As a result, the training and enrollment data are converted in a similar way as the trial data, but the target speaker associated with every speaker in the enrollment set is typically different from that associated with the same speaker in the converted trial set. Finally, our Informed attacker has access to the actual VC models and target choices used to anonymize the trial set, so it converts the training and enrollment sets accordingly.
In our preliminary experiments, we also considered attackers who convert the enrollment set only and use x-vector/i-vector models trained on the untransformed training set. Unsurprisingly, we found that this leads to significantly larger equal error rates (EER) than retraining the x-vector/i-vector model (which can easily be done by the attacker using public benchmark data). Therefore, we do not report results for such attackers below. 
Results and discussion
We first train and apply the ASR and speaker verification systems on the original (untransformed) data for baseline performance. We obtain an EER of 4.61% and 4.31% for i-vector and x-vector, respectively, and a WER of 9.4% for ASR. Tables 1 and 2 present the EER for x-vector and i-vector speaker verification systems for the three attackers and the various choices of VC methods and target selection strategies. Interestingly, the Informed attacker achieves EER values similar to (or even slightly lower than) the baseline. This indicates that, when the attacker has complete knowledge of the VC scheme and target speaker mapping, none of the VC methods is able to protect the speaker identity. While an attacker with such complete knowledge is not very realistic in most practical cases, our results show that speaker information has not been totally removed and is somehow still present in the converted speech.
For the more realistic Semi-Informed attacker, we observe that strategy perm is quite effective in protecting privacy and shows the highest gains in EER. This is due to the fact that the target speaker in the enrolled data may not be same as the one in trial, hence greater confusion is induced during inference. We also notice that strategy random is not much affected by the change of speaker mapping, which is intuitive because in this case the utterances are already being mapped randomly to different speakers. Such mapping would be ineffective due to averaging of randomness. Strategy const is also slightly affected by the change of mapping because the training and enrollment speaker is not same as that of test speaker, but the effect is not as significant as strategy perm.
Consistently with previous results of the literature, the Ignorant attacker performs worst with respect to EER. This confirms that, when the attacker is oblivious to the privacy-preserving mechanism, we can protect speaker identity completely. Figure 1 shows the ivector score distribution for genuine and impostor trials. We observe that the overlap between the two distributions increases as we move from the Informed to the Ignorant attacker. Table 3 gives the WER obtained for each VC method, which we use as a proxy for the usefulness of the converted speech. Note that there is no difference between converted data in different attack scenarios, hence the WER does not depend on the attacker. Voice-Mask and VTLN-based VC achieve reasonable WER compared to the untransformed data, while the disentangled representation based VC produces unreasonably high WER. Note that these WERs are achieved when ASR is trained solely using converted data. In practice, many techniques can be used optimize the WER, such as using converted data to augment clean data.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We investigated the use of VC methods to protect the privacy of speakers by concealing their identity. We formally defined target speaker selection strategies and attack scenarios based on the knowledge of attacker. Our experimental results indicate that both aspects play an important role in the strength of the protection. Simple methods such as VTLN-based VC with appropriate target selection strategy can provide reasonable protection against attackers with partial knowledge. Our characterization of strategies and attack scenarios opens up several avenues for future research. To increase the naturalness of converted speech, we can explore intra-gender VC as well as the use of a supervised phonetic classifier in VTLN. We also plan to conduct experiments with a broader range of attackers to precisely evaluate the privacy protection in various scenarios. More generally, designing a privacy-preserving transformation which induces a large overlap between genuine and impostor distributions even in the Informed attack scenario remains an open question. In the case of disentangled representations, this calls for avoiding any leakage of private attributes into the content embeddings.
